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INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, January 16, 2000, the Taliban government of Af-
ghanistan recognized the secessionist government of Chechnya and,
moreover, recognized Chechnya as an independent State. Through its
foreign minister, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel, the Afghan government
stated, "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has decided to accord
immediate recognition to the government of an independent Chech-
nya."' This statement of recognition was followed a week later by an
announcement that the Chechen government was opening an em-
* Visiting Fellow, 1999-2000, Max-Planck-lnstitute for International Law,
Heidelberg, Germany. Fellow-elect, St. Anne's College, Oxford. The author thanks
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for its Bundeskanzler Scholarship, which
has supported his work in Heidelberg. The author is a member of the bars of Mas-
sachusetts, New York, and Washington, DC.
1. See Afghanistan's Taliban Recognizes Rebel Rule in Chechnya," AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2713862; Chechnya-
Afghanistan: Chechen President Lauds Taliban Decision on Recognition, EFE
NEWs SERV., Jan. 17, 2000, available in WESTLAW WIREPLUS File.
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bassy in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.2
Chechnya is a territorial unit on the north side of the Caucasus
mountain range that covers an area about the size of Connecticut.'
The population was estimated in early 1996 at around one million.'
Notwithstanding, Chechnya is said to possess strategic importance
greater than its size. Chechnya commands the route of pipelines
from oil-rich Azerbaijan to Russia and it has oil and natural gas re-
sources of its own. 6 Moreover, Chechnya lies along post-Soviet Rus-
sia's southern flank-a particularly sensitive area, because of its pre-
dominantly Muslim population, its proximity to the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and Russia's great concern, whether well-founded or not,
that the Muslim regions of the Russian Federation might look to po-
litical changes in Chechnya as a model for themselves.7 Chechnya
2. A semi-official Chechen web site reported that the Chechen embassy in
Kabul opened on January 21, 2000, with former Chechen president Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev on hand for the occasion. See Segodnya v. Kabule Otfrylos' Po-
sol'stvo ChRI An Embassy of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya Opened Today in
Kabul (visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http://www.kavkaz.org/news/2000/0I /
news2l_01.htm> (Russian language text). The western media reported the em-
bassy opening on January 23, 2000. See, e.g., Chechen Embassy Opens in Kabul,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 23, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2718503; Chechen Re-
bels Open Afghan Embassy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 23, 2000, available in 2000
WL 9750060; Chechen Rebels Open Embassy in Afghan Capital, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000, available in WESTLAW ALLNEWSPLUS File.
3. See THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD xiii (1994) (providing entries for
Caucasus and northeast United States).
4. See THE TERRITORIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 50 (Europa Publica-
tions Ltd., 1999) [hereinafter TERRITORIES] (estimating the population of Chech-
nya in 1996 to be 921, 000 individuals).
5. One writer familiar with the Caucasus and Central Asia notes, for example,
that "[fJor the U.S., the stakes are prestige, its bilateral relations with Turkey, and
the future of NATO." Michael A. Reynolds, Central Asia is No Game, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Jan. 25, 2000, at 14.
6. See CARLOTTA GALL & THOMAS DE WAAL, CHECHNYA: A CALAMITY IN
THE CAUCASUS 127-28 (1998).
7. See KAREN DAWISHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF
EURASIA: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 99-101 (1994) (describing "Islamophobia"
and fears of separatism in Russia). Of Russia's 147 million citizens, twenty-seven
million belong to non-Russian ethnic groups, and many of these are Muslim. See
id. at 67. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, two autonomous republics in the Russian
Federation, are perhaps the most prominent examples of territorial units with sig-
nificant Muslim populations; their secession would seriously damage Russia's
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has claimed independence from Russia since autumn 1991. It has de-
fended this claim twice successfully-once in 1991 against a desul-
tory and small-scale Russian police action and again from 1994 to
1996 against a large-scale Russian invasion. In September 1999,
Russia again invaded Chechnya. By late January 2000, Russian
forces established positions in the northern part of the country and
some parts of the capital city, Grozny, but Chechen resistance fight-
ers remained in control of many areas, leaving few Russian positions
secure. Currently, Russia only recognizes Chechnya as one of the
eighty-nine constituent units of the Russian Federation" and not as an
independent State. In addition, until Afghanistan recently recognized
Chechnya as an independent State, no other country had done so. In
fact, most States and key international organizations made it clear
that they recognized that Chechnya belonged to the Russian Federa-
tion and that they respected the territorial integrity of Russia.
The legal stance taken by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France vis-A.-vis the Russian Federation were indicative of those
taken by most states and international organizations. The United
States stated: "we support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Russian Federation." 9 The United Kingdom stated: "the exercise
of the right [of self-determination] must also take into account ... re-
spect for the principle [of] territorial integrity of the unitary state.""'
According to France, Chechnya belongs to the Russian Federation
and respect for the basic principle of sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity is one of the fundamental rules of international existence." UN
economic and territorial cohesion. See TERRITORIES, supra note 4, at 4346, 98-
100.
8. See Philip Hanson & Michael J. Bradshaw, The Territories and the Fed-
eration: An Economic Perspective, in THE TERRITORIES OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 3, 3-14 (Europa Publications Ltd., 1999) (providing an overview of
the structure of the Russian Federation).
9. Strobe Talbott, Supporting Democracy and Economic Rejbrm in the New
Independent States, 6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 119, 120 (1995).
10. 563 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 476, quoted in BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 621
(1995) (noting also that no country has yet recognized Chechnya).
11. See Pratique Frangaise du Droit International, 41 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROrr INTERNATIONAL 911 (1995) (translation in text by author) (quoting state-
ment of the French foreign minister on Jan. 9, 1995) ("La Tch6tch6nie fait partie
de la F6d6ration de Russie. Le respet du principe de souverainet6 et d'int6grit6 ter-
ritoriale est une des r~gles de base de la vie intemationale").
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officials, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees, discussed
Chechnya in language that made it clear that Chechnya is part of the
Russian Federation. 2 The Council of Europe Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities, in proffering its good offices to assist in
reaching a settlement in the North Caucasus, emphasized "respect
both of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federation of
Russia and the legitimate aspirations of the Chechen population.""
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, in a resolution ex-
pressing concern over the conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya,
stated "Russia has the right to preserve its territorial integrity and to
protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism."'" Very recently, the
Republic of Georgia ("Georgia"), the former Soviet State immedi-
ately to the south of Chechnya and the territory on which Chechen
resistance fighters allegedly took refuge, interpreted Afghanistan's
recognition of Chechnya as no more that its recognition of Chechnya
as a territory of the Russian Federation. In fact, a deputy foreign
minister of Georgia stated on January 17, 2000 that Georgia "has
ruled out the possibility" of recognizing Chechnya as an independent
State. "
Recognition of Chechnya as an independent State by Afghanistan,
therefore, stands out against current practice. The remainder of this
article will discuss various aspects of Afghanistan's recognition of
Chechnya and its possible implications.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE
TALIBAN GOVERNMENT
States, notwithstanding the substantial role of non-State actors,
12. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3558 (1999) (stating that Sadako Ogata, U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, took note on Nov. 12, 1999 of the "serious hu-
manitarian situation in the southern border of the Russian Federation").
13. Council of Europe, The CLRAE Reaffirms its Availability in the Search jor
a Political Solution in Chechnya, Jan. 14, 2000 (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http://www.coe.fr/cp/2000/23a%282000%29.htm>.
14. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Declaration on Chechnva,
Paris, Dec. 13, 1999 (visited Mar. 4, 2000) <http://www.coe.fr/cp/99/720a%
2899%29.htm>.
15. See Georgia Rules out Recognizing Chechnya's Independence, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTION, Jan. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL 10329848 (attributing
statement to Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Burauli).
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continue to hold a leading position in international law." One distin-
guished publicist writes, "the fact remains that since 1945 the exis-
tence of States has provided the basis of the legal order."" Accord-
ingly, recognition of a claim by a non-State actor has less impact
than recognition by a State. Recent practice has encouraged some
international law scholars to reiterate an old thesis-namely, that
existing States decide what entities constitute States."' Setting aside
the validity of the thesis that States play a constitutive gatekeeper
role in international society,' 9 scholars, when referring to recognition
of a claim to statehood, have seldom meant recognition by any entity
other than a State.20 It is of threshold importance, then, in assessing
the impact of the recognition of Chechnya by the Taliban govern-
16. See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention
and its Discontents, 37 COLUI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 404-07 (1999) (describing
the range of non-State actors present in the contemporary international system).
17. Ian Brownlie, Rebirth of Statehood, in ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND
INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 5, 5 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1997).
18. See Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International
Cominmunity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 491, 493 (1998). Hillgruber posits that recognition
is a signal that the international community believes that a putative State is likely
to abide by the principles that the community wishes to promote as international
law. See id. Furthermore, he argues that before recognition, a State lacks interna-
tional legal personality. See id.
19. I discuss elsewhere the long-running debate between so-called "constitu-
tivists" and "declaratists." The constitutive view was that recognition alone creates
States. The declarist view held that recognition merely marked the fact that the
claimant had already met certain requirements-i.e., that the entity claiming state-
hood was already a State. See generally THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF
STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 1-45 (1999).
20. The salient exception-but possibly one that proves the rule--is that of
admission to international organizations, especially admission to the United Na-
tions ("UN"). John Dugard argued in 1987 that admission to the UN was tanta-
mount to recognition and marked the formation of a system of collective recogni-
tion-recognition of States binding on all States but conducted by a super-national
authority. See generally JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1987). The UN, however, itself is constituted of States and the decisions whether
or not to admit new members is controlled by the member States of the UN. To
speak, then, of the UN as recognizing States may be only partially correct. Moreo-
ver, individual UN member States continue to assert that the discretion whether or
not to recognize an entity as a State is a matter of "sovereign" discretion. Insofar as
States admit that recognition must be controlled by a collective process, the exact
measure and form of that collective process remains unclear. See GRANT, supra
note 19, at 188-93, 214-18.
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ment, to assess the nature of the actor granting that recognition.
A government is not a State.2' A State is an international legal per-
son,2 formally co-equal with other States under international law." A
government is an agent with authority to represent a State in interna-
tional law.24 As such, undertakings of a government have binding ef-
fect upon a State and generally one government of a State cannot
disavow agreements or liabilities incurred by a predecessor govern-
25
ment of the same State.
Recognition of Chechnya by the Taliban takes on its greatest pos-
sible significance if actions of the Taliban are legally binding on the
State of Afghanistan. If, indeed the Taliban is, as it claims to be, the
government of the State of Afghanistan, then its acts are binding on
21. This is reflected in the distinction between recognition of a government and
a State. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, sec. 203, cmt. a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A state cannot rec-
ognize or accept a regime as a government without thereby accepting the statehood
of the entity which the regime claims to be governing. A state can, however, treat
an entity as a state while denying that a particular regime is a government").
22. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (4th
ed. 1990) (noting that the criteria of statehood are laid down by the law of nations).
23. See id. at 287-91 ("The sovereignty and equality of states represent the ba-
sic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations").
24. See STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW vii-viii (1998) (noting that the use of the term "government" by a group indi-
cates only its claim to governmental status and not necessarily its status as such in
international law); id. at 14-15 (discussing recognition of governments in exile); id.
at 67 ("The government of a sovereign State, properly so called in international
law, is the depository of the State's sovereignty, exclusively entitled in interna-
tional law to represent that State in its international relations and to exercise its
sovereign rights").
25. See HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND
NOTES 209-12 (2d ed. 1952) (citing numerous cases arising from the Russian
Revolution); Continuity of States, 1 HACKWORTH DIGEST, sec. 56, at 387-92 (not-
ing that "all rights and title to property belonging to a State continue to vest in it
regardless of changes in its government"); The Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great
Britain v. Costa Rica), I R.I.A.A. 369, 381 (1923) (holding that even actions of
unrecognized governments are binding upon subsequent governments); see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 63, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) ("The severance of diplomatic or consular re-
lations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established
between them by the treaty except in so far as the existence of diplomatic and con-
sular relations is indispensable for the application of the treaty").
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the State of Afghanistan. The status of the Taliban, with respect to
the State of Afghanistan, is, however, not entirely clear.
There was a time when governments routinely recognized new
governments in other States, but modem practice witnessed the fad-
ing of that procedure. The change in British practice in 1988 was
representative of the trend. '6 Today, in most cases, other governments
do not formally recognize changes in the government of a State.2'
States may sever or downgrade diplomatic relations, as opposed to
making an express declaration of non-recognition, in order to protest
a new government.2
Recent examples demonstrate a movement away from the express
non-recognition of changes in government, as seen in Zaire/Congo at
the end of the government of Mobutu Sese Seko.' Practice toward
26. See BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 105-06 (explaining the decision of the
British Government to discontinue its practice of recognizing governments owing
to widespread misunderstandings that such recognition represented British ap-
proval of the governments and their policies). Other States eschewing recognition
of governments have been Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, and Switzerland.
See M.J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND
STATE PRACTICE 1815-1995, at 88 (1997) (noting, however, that contenders for
power frequently seek explicit statements of recognition from abroad to bolster
their legitimacy).
27. Consider the United States' position: "In recent years, U.S. practice has
been to de-emphasize and avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of gov-
erments and to concern ourselves with the question of whether we wish to have
diplomatic relations with the new governments." Diplomatic Relations and Recog-
nition, 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW sec. 3,
at 20. This was still the approach used when compiling the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States in 1986. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 21, sec. 203, reporter's note 1 (confirming the continuation of the practice).
The approach applies in particular where a change of government occurs through
normal procedures. See id. sec. 203, cmt. c ("Where a new administration succeeds
to power in accordance with a state's constitutional processes, no issue of recogni-
tion or acceptance arises; continued recognition is assumed.").
28. There are two leading treatments of recognition of governments in recent
literature. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 26 (providing an overview of the crite-
ria, forms, and political uses of government recognition); STEFAN TALMON,
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE (1998) (discussing the de facto, de jure,
and diplomatic recognition and the effect such recognition has on the legal status
of governments, particularly those in exile).
29. See Thomas D. Grant, An Institution Restored?, 39 VA. J. INr'L L. 191-92
(1998) (emphasizing that a number of States that previously stated they would no
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contemporary Afghanistan is a different example because the violent
unrest, involving outside intervention as well as ethnic and religious
conflict among indigenous groups for most of the 1980s and 1990s
made governance in Afghanistan extremely difficult.0 On September
27, 1996, the Taliban, a militia composed of fundamentalist Muslim
students, took control of the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, and cur-
rently controls much of the rest of the country.3 Despite the unsettled
situation, few States doubt Afghanistan's legitimacy as a State. Af-
ghanistan holds a seat at the United Nations ("UN")32 and holds
membership in various other international organizations. 3 The terri-
torial extent of Afghanistan is reasonably certain. 4 Nonetheless, the
Taliban government that now controls over ninety percent of Af-
ghanistan, however, received little recognition as the government of
Afghanistan, and more importantly, many States expressly indicated
that they do not recognize it but continue to recognize its predeces-
sor, the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani," as the government of
Afghanistan. International organizations, including the UN and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, likewise denied or delayed
seating Taliban representatives for the Afghanistan seat.36 The Tali-
longer give express recognition to changes of government formally acknowledged
both the new regime and the change of the country's name to The Congo).
30. See generally J. Alexander Their, Afghanistan: Minority Rights and Auton-
omy in a Multi-Ethnic Failed State, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 351 (1999) (providing a
thorough account of the constitutional and political history of Afghanistan, with a
particular emphasis on minority treatment based, in large part, on the author's ex-
perience working with international aid organizations in Afghanistan).
31. See id. at 352.
32. See United Nations (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.un.org> (providing
information about member States, committees, and documents).
33. See, e.g., CIA World Factbook 1999 (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.
odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/af.html> (describing Afghanistan's participa-
tion in international organizations, such as the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence, International Monetary Fund, International Labor Organization, International
Telecommunications Union, and the Universal Postal Union).
34. See id. (including map of Afghanistan).
35. See Mohammad Bashir, Afghan Taliban call on Muslim world to recognise
Chechnya, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2714266
(indicating that former Afghanistan President, Rabbani, and his military leader,
Ahmad Sha Masood, control portions of the country in the northeast and are rec-
ognized by and receive material support from the Russian Federation).
36. See TALMON, supra note 28, at 173-84 (discussing the representation of
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ban's efforts to implement an extreme interpretation of Islamic law,
especially as it applies to Afghani women, have turned some opinion
against the de facto regime, demonstrating the contrast between its
effective control over much of Afghanistan and its near-universal
lack of recognition. 7 To date, only Pakistan, the United Arab Emir-
ates, and Saudi Arabia have recognized the Taliban as the govern-
ment of Afghanistan."
Taliban's international and domestic status example is a salient
feature of its recent recognition of the Chechens' claim for statehood,
namely, it is recognition given by a government that itself is not
widely viewed to have authority to act on behalf of the State it claims
to represent. Because it controls most of Afghanistan, the Taliban
differs from exiled governments or "national liberation movements"
that claim to form the "sole legitimate" governments of a State but
have little or no effective footing on the territory of that State."
Nonetheless, the legal effect of the Taliban's recognition of Chech-
nya on January 16, 2000 must be qualified by the fact that most
States deny the Taliban's legal authority to represent Afghanistan
governments in international bodies, including situations where a government-in-
exile, instead of a sitting government, represent the State); id. (describing mainly
governments-in-exile that do not have any territorial control of the States they rep-
resent, in contrast to the Rabbani government's ten percent territorial control).
37. See Maijon E. Ghasemi, Islam, hternational Human Rights & Women s
Equality: Afghan Women Under Taliban Rule, 8 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMIEN'S
STUD. 445 (1999) (arguing that there should be no international recognition of the
Taliban regime until the Taliban's policies toward women improve); Anastasia
Telesetsky, In the Shadows and Behind the Veil: Women in Afghanistan Under
Taliban Rule, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 292, 294 (1998) (describing the Tali-
ban's treatment of women, Western and Islamic reactions, and possible legal
remedies for women); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
RECOGNITION OR ACCEPTANCE OF GOVERNMENTS sec. 203(2) (noting that States
are not obligated to recognize a regime that has asserted its control through the
threat or use of force). "A state has an obligation not to recognize or treat a regime
as the government of another state if its control has been effected by the threat or
use of armed force in violation of the United Nations Charter." hl.
38. See Afghanistan's Taliban recognises rebel rule in Chechnya, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2713820 [hereinafter .Ilighanistans
Taliban] (emphasizing that the UN and most countries continue to recognize only
the Rabbani regime).
39. See TALMON, supra note 28, at 300, 303 (describing the exiled govern-
ments in Angola and Algeria as governments that lacked efTective control in the
territory of the State they each claimed to govern).
20001 877
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
and to act as its sovereign authority.40
The Taliban's recognition of Chechnya, therefore, may do no
more than recapitulate Chechnya's earlier international relations in
the territory's tumultuous history. Russia first laid claim to Chechnya
in the eighteenth century, but its hold there remained tenuous at
best.41 Following the victory over Napoleon in 1815, the Tsar of Rus-
sia began a campaign to extend his writ to Chechnya, which insti-
gated forty years of war.4' At the crest of their resistance, the
Chechens formed a well-organized administration exercising many
of the features associated with a State's domestic responsibilities.4'
Attempts to obtain general recognition as a State, however, did not
succeed. The Ottoman State, in its role as champion of Muslim peo-
ples, supported the Chechen resisters both with material aid and
symbolic statements. 44 Egypt, too, apparently tendered various forms
of assistance as well. 45 It is unclear, however, whether either of those
Muslim powers expressly recognized Chechnya, while it is clear that
no western State recognized the nineteenth century Chechen claim to
statehood 6 Perhaps the most substantial links formed by the nine-
40. See Afghanistan's Taliban, supra note 38.
41. See MOSHE GAMMER, MUSLIM RESISTANCE TO THE TSAR: SHAMIL AND THE
CONQUEST OF CHECHNIA AND DAGHESTAN 229 (1994) (providing a thorough ac-
count in English of the nineteenth century Chechen State).
42. See id. at 229-30 (describing the various combat efforts against the Rus-
sians).
43. See id. at 225-35 (explaining the composition and maintenance of the
Chechen military forces, financial affairs, and legal system (Shari'a)).
44. See id. at 257-60, 267-76 (noting the relationship between the Ottoman
empire and the Chechens, particularly during the Crimean War).
45. See Moshe Gammer, The Imam and the Pasha: A Note on Shamil and
Muhammad Ali, 32 MIDDLE E. STUD. 336-42 (1996) (commenting on relations
between the West, Egypt, and the Soviet Union, concerning Muslim resistance to
Russian occupation).
46. British strategists, during the Crimean War, contemplated recognizing
Chechnya or a North Caucasian "emirate" as part of a comprehensive post-war
plan to roll back Russian power, but recognition was not in fact granted. See J.B.
CONACHER, BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEA, 1855-56: PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE
188 (1987) (describing Lord Palmerston's Crimean War plans); JOHN SHELTON
CURTISS, RUSSIA'S CRIMEAN WAR 419 (1979) (indicating Britain's overestimation
of Turkey's ability to confront Russia's strength in the Caucasus); ANDREW D.
LAMBERT, THE CRIMEAN WAR: BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY 1853-56, xxi (1990)
(criticizing Britain's weak strategy in attacking Russia in order to maintain British
878 [15:869
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teenth century Chechen "State" and outside political organizations
were with other Muslim resistance movements, not internationally
recognized as constituting States.47 Abd al-Qadir resisted French
colonizers in Algeria and may have made contact with the Chechens,
while the Chechens sent representatives to the Kurdish areas of the
Ottoman empire and Persia to successfully win recruits to their
cause.4 The Circassians and Kabardians, Muslim peoples on the op-
posite end of the Caucasus, who also resisted Russia, allied them-
selves with the Chechens.49 The Chechen administration reportedly at
times even sought links to Christians in Georgia and Ossetia who
were discontent with Russian rule. €° The legal consequence, if any, of
relations between one unrecognized State and others or between the
unrecognized State and insurgent communities, governments-in-
exile, or other non-State actors is unclear. Since the nineteenth cen-
tury, the foregoing relations have not had any pronounced legal ef-
fect.5" Assuming that it was indeed the intention of some or all of the
outside non-State actors previously mentioned to recognize the
nineteenth century Chechen claim to statehood, the demonstrable
impact on the international legal position of the Chechens was small
or non-existent. No State protested, for example, when the Tsar of
Russia declared himself "Hereditary Prince and Sovereign of the
Princes of Circasia and of the Other Montagnard Princes," making
him ruler of the entire Caucasus range, including Chechnya.'2
interests in the Caucasus).
47. See GAMMER, supra note 41, at 248-56 (describing the relationships the
Chechen "State" shared with its neighbors and local ethnic and religious tribes).
48. See id. at 250-52 (describing the recruitment of volunteers for the Chechen
mission).
49. See id. at 251.
50. See id. at 248-56, 263 (describing the Chechen collaboration with Christian
tribes as a means to divert Russia from its control in Chechnya and Daghestan,
while at the same time uniting tribes in the Caucasus).
51. See TALMON, supra note 28, at 305-06 (commenting on the example of the
Philippine secessionist government, Unity Front of the South Moluccan People,
which received no recognition except for an unspecified recognition by the anti-
Communist Polish government-in-exile).
52. See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Russia and Turkey, Jan.
22, 1862, 125 C.T.S. 239 (documenting the Tsar's claim over the Caucasus region,
using the term "Montangard" to refer to Chechens and other mountain-dwelling
people in nineteenth century Caucasus).
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The position of the Taliban in Afghanistan today differs from that
of unrecognized non-State groups, because the State of Afghanistan
is recognized in addition to the Taliban's control of most of Afghani-
stan. The Taliban government's claim that it is the agent of Afghani-
stan, however, is not widely recognized.
II. ENDING THE DIPLOMATIC BLOCKADE?
Many countries have employed and threatened sanctions in order
to deter recognition of claims that they believed derogated their
rights; for example, West Germany employed the sanctions tactic
with regard to East Germany in the 195 Os.14 The tactic has also been
employed to combat claims for statehood that a country believes is a
violation of its territorial integrity. For example, the People's Re-
public of China employed and threatened sanctions to deter recogni-
tion of Taiwan as the Republic of China; the Republic of Cyprus (or
its patron, Greece) used sanctions to deter recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus; Morocco used and threatened sanc-
tions to deter recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic;
and the Arab League (on behalf of Palestine) used the threat of sanc-
tions to deter recognition of Israel." Similarly, former Russian For-
eign Minister Yevgeni Primakov" and other officials" made it clear
that Russia will interpret any recognition of Chechnya as an affront
53. See Afghanistan's Taliban, supra note 38.
54. See FRITZ A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 671 n.4 (1973) (de-
lineating the events following the division of post-war Germany and the effect of
Soviet recognition of East Germany); see also Josef Jurina, Deutschlands Rechlt-
slage, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECIIT UND
VOLKERRECHT 455 (1963) (providing the diplomatic relationship of the divided
Germanys).
55. See Thomas D. Grant, Hallstein Revisited: Unilateral Enforcement of Re-
gines of Non-Recognition Since the Two Germanies, STAN. J. INT'L L. (forthcom-
ing 2000).
56. Viktoria Grankina et al., Moscow Continues to Regard Chechnva as a
Subject of the Federation, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG. (from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA)
Jan. 30, 1997 (indicating that Russia has no intention of recognizing Chechnya,
despite the recent presidential elections in Chechnya).
57. Charodeyev & Yusin, Moscow-Grozny: Dispute Around Embassies,
RUSSIAN PRESS DIG. (from IZVESTIA) Apr. 22, 1998 (describing the Russian For-
eign Ministry's outrage at the acting Chechen president's appointment of nine
Chechen ambassddors).
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to Russia and will respond by severing diplomatic relations with the
State granting such recognition. When Chechnya sent emissaries to
explore the possibility of setting up diplomatic missions abroad, the
Russian Federation indicated that such missions would be illegal."
During a parliamentary discussion in Lithuania in which opposition
delegates proposed that Lithuania recognize Chechnya, Russia
warned that it would sever diplomatic relations with any government
recognizing Chechnya. 9 Russia, in effect, constructed a diplomatic
blockade to prevent other independent States from providing official
State recognition to a territory that Russia views as its own.
As a result of either the blockade or because individual States
agree on the basis of their own legal assessments that Russia has le-
gal title to Chechnya, the Russian view has prevailed. "' Not only
Georgia but also other States with a heightened interest in the crisis
have indicated that they continue to respect the view set forth by the
Russian Federation that Chechnya is an integral part of the territory
of the Russian Federation.6' Pakistan, however, has not responded fa-
vorably to Chechen overtures conveyed through the Taliban.i : The
United States granted a visa to the Foreign Minister of Chechnya,
Ilyas Akhmadov, in January 2000 but assigned low-level State De-
partment staff to meet with him during his time in Washington and
the meeting did not take place on United States government prem-
ises.63 This is consistent with earlier United States and United King-
58. See Chechnya out for unlawful diplomatic representation, warns federal
foreign ministry (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.rian.rw>.
59. Yuri Stroganov, Vytautas Landsbergis: "'1 Was Assured that Lithuania
Would Be a NATO Member," RUSSIAN PRESS DIG. (from TRUD) June 10, 1997
(pointing out that the Chair of the Lithuanian Parliament was against official rec-
ognition of Chechnya, because it would strain Lithuania's relationship with Rus-
sia).
60. See Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts fir Chechnya: Purposes and
Prospects in Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 118-19 (1999)
(noting the response of western officials to the visit by the President of Chechnya).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Chechnya Seen Gaining World's
Understanding (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://wwv.rferi.org/welcome/english/ re-
leasesfchechnya000118.html> (describing Chechen Foreign Minister Illyas Ak-
hadadov's meeting with junior State Department officials and Senator Chuck
Hagel).
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dom practice.
A number of States were reported to have recognized Chechen in-
dependence, but none of these States or the media would confirm the
recognition when queried.65 Considering the importance of the sym-
bolic dimension of recognition, "hidden" or "clandestine" recogni-
tion would be a contradiction in terms. States have made declarations
short of recognition by challenging the view that the Chechen crisis
only concerns Russia. An Estonian representative, for example,
stated before a UN committee that the crisis in Chechnya is not
strictly internal, thereby implying that the territorial integrity of Rus-
sia does not insulate Russian conduct in Chechnya from international
observation or reaction. 6  This is consistent with a number of multi-
lateral organizations that have taken note of the Chechen crisis on
humanitarian grounds.
It should be noted that the UN in autumn 1999 did not expressly
reiterate respect for the territorial integrity of Russia while it empha-
sized human rights.6 ' The office of the Secretary General, for exam-
ple, in connection with arrangements for a mission to the North Cau-
64. See Grant, supra note 60, at 115, 116 n.3, 118-19 (1999) (noting protocol
by United States and United Kingdom officials during visits by the President of
Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, in 1997 and 1998).
65. See Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Russia-Chechnya: A Forced Love Affair,
Moscow NEwS, Nov. 18, 1992, cited in Duncan B. Hollis, Accountability in
Chechnya-Addressing Internal Matters with Legal and Political International
Norms, 36 B.C. L. REV. 793, 799 n.40 (1995) (pointing out a Russian journalist's
report on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian recognition of Chechnya); see also BOGDAN
SZAJKOWSKI, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CONFLICTS, DISPUTES, AND FLASHPOINTS IN
EASTERN EUROPE, RUSSIA AND THE SUCCESSOR STATES 63 (1993) (noting indica-
tions that Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Lithuania, and Estonia recognized Chechnya);
Sergei Zavorotny, Politica "Small Fry" Ready to Play Up Chechen Ace, RUSSIAN
PRESS DIG. (from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA), Jan. 27, 1997 (describing Chech-
nya's strategy of gaining recognition from Turkey, Jordan, and other countries in
the Middle East); Igor Rotar, Ichkeria Insists on Being Recognized, RUSSIAN PRESS
DIGEST (from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA), Oct. 22, 1997.
66. See U.N. Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee Press Release,
U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3557 (1999) (containing statements of Committee members in
regards to the protection of children during armed conflict, where the Estonian rep-
resentative described the situation in Chechnya to be more than a simple domestic
matter).
67. See id.
68. See U.N. Press Release, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7200 (1999).
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casus, stated:
The Secretary-General has, for some weeks, been concerned about the se-
vere impact of the conflict in Chechnya on the civilian population, many
thousands of whom have been driven from their homes. He is in touch
with the Russian authorities and has sent a senior official to Moscow to
discuss the possibility of sending a UN humanitarian assistance mission to
the Northern Caucasus (Ingushetia and Dagestan). Those consultations
were successful, and a mission will leave for the region very soon-pos-
sibly before the end of the month.
The Secretary-General reiterates his appeal to both sides in the conflict to
show restraint, and to take special care to avoid civilian casualties. While
the problem of terrorism is one of legitimate concern to all governments,
it is important that the response to it should be proportional, and that the
provisions of humanitarian law in armed conflict are respected at all
times. In situations as complex as that in Chechnya, the solution must ul-
timately be political.6
Following an ultimatum from the Russian armed forces to the in-
habitants of Grozny "to leave or die," the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, which previously maintained an Assis-
tance Group in Chechnya, also issued statements emphasizing human
rights but omitting direct reference to the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation or Chechnya itself, ' and increased activity by the
Counsel of Europe appears to be part of a trend."'
Nevertheless, Russia's non-recognition policy towards Chechnya
appears largely successful. The international organization practice,
noted above, may display an incremental change-from careful in-
69. Press Release SG/SM/7200, Oct. 28, 1999 (describing the Secretary Gen-
eral's concern about the impact the Chechen conflict had on the civilian popula-
tion).
70. See, e.g., OSCE Press Release (visited Jan. 26, 2000) <http://www.osce.
org/indexe-da.htm> (emphasizing the Russian Federation's obligations, under in-
ternational human rights and humanitarian law, to protect civilians in Grozny dur-
ing the conflict).
71. See Chechnya: Council of Europe talks with Russian authorities (visited
Mar. 3, 2000) <http://wwv.coe.fr/cp/2000/19a%282000%29.htm> (describing the
dispatch of a high-level mission led by Lord Russell-Johnston, President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council, to the North Caucasus and Moscow from
Jan. 14 to Jan. 20, 2000).
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clusion of "territorial integrity" formulations in every statement to a
less conditional emphasis on human rights-but it is a far cry from
formal acknowledgment that Chechnya possesses the international
legal status that its rebel authorities claim. Insofar as Russian diplo-
macy concerning Chechnya may be conceived as a blockade, the
source of the sole recognition-the Taliban government of Afghani-
stan-may strengthen the blockade. Spokespersons for the Russian
Federation were quick to note that the Taliban government is not
only widely unrecognized but also widely condemned. 7 Drug traf-
ficking and terrorism purportedly taking place under its auspices
have marginalized the Taliban government in international processes
of authority.73 For example, the Afghani predecessor-government is
still recognized by most States and continues to hold the Afghanistan
seat on the General Assembly.14 Recognition of Chechnya by one
State might be seen as an incremental step toward the erosion of the
Russian blockade, however, recognition by Afghanistan might just as
well confirm majority practice.
Hypothetically, even if the Taliban government is widely recog-
nized as the agent with the authority to enter into binding agreements
for Afghanistan, and whose undertakings are in other ways oppos-
able against Afghanistan, recognition by one State alone is compara-
tively marginal in the power processes of the world community, and
would likely have little effect on the legal status of the object of rec-
72. See Russia denounces Taliban Recognition of Chechnya, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 17, 2000 (claiming that the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation
states that the recognition of Chechnya by the Taliban "leads to the creation of
some sort of a bandit international, which once again proves the urgent need for
the international community to join forces in the fight against this universal evil-
terrorism"); Chechnya-Afghanistan: Chechen President Lauds Taliban Decision
on Recognition, EFE NEWS SERV., Jan. 17, 2000 (noting that Russia was also re-
ported as characterizing the recognition as an act of "terrorist solidarity"). See gen-
erally Ghasemi, supra note 37, at 445; Telesetsky, supra note 37, at 292.
73. See Six Plus Two Group Contemplating to Lay Security Belt Around, PAK.
PRESS INT'L INFO. SERV. LTD., Mar. 1, 2000, available in 2000 WL 15354830 (de-
scribing UN initiatives aimed at curtailing the drug flow from the Taliban-
controlled areas of Afghanistan).
74. See Afghanistan's Taliban, supra note 38 (noting limited recognition of
Taliban as government of Afghanistan and UN "recognition" of Rabbani govern-
ment).
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ognition.7 "The consequences [of a decision to recognize]," accord-
ing to some scholars, "will vary depending on the relative power of
the recognizer and the relative dependence of the community seeking
recognition. 7 6 It may well be that the "relative dependence" of
Chechnya is great but that dependence is not upon Afghanistan; and
the relative power of the recognizer, Afghanistan, is weak.- Finally,
the number of States recognizing a claim to statehood itself may be
important. What one recognizing State may lack in individual
authoritative weight may be bolstered if joined by other States.- It
could be that the Taliban, by taking up the Chechen cause, draws
States toward greater support for the Chechens. States more likely
than others to follow the Taliban government's lead would be, in the
first instance, those recognizing the Taliban as the official govern-
ment of Afghanistan-these States are Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates. The Russian blockade against recognition
75. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
303 (1981) (describing the various factors that determine international recogni-
tion).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 303.
78. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service, UN ICJ REP. 171, 185
(1949) (demonstrating a common understanding of the relationship between trea-
ties and generally applicable international norms). The more parties to a treaty, the
stronger the evidence that the treaty represents such a norm. See hi.
79. See Mohammad Bashir, Afghan Taliban call on Muhslim world to recognise
Chechnya, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 17, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2714266
(noting that, though the association just as well could act against the Chechens,
Taliban officials since recognizing Chechnya have begun what appears to be a
diplomatic program to broaden the basis of support). Taliban Minister of Informa-
tion, Qudratullah Jamal, said, "it is the obligation of all Muslims to recognize the
Chechen government." Id. See Afghan Taliban criticise Iran over Chechnva,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 25, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2719844 (pointing out
that Deputy Minister of Information, Abdurrahman Hotak, later criticized Iran for
having "made deals with the Russians" and urged Iran, as current head of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference, to lobby support for the Chechens); Taliban
to welcome Pak-Iran efforts for return ofpeace, BUSINESS RECORDER (visited Jan.
25, 2000) <http://%vwv.brecorder.comstory/S00DD/ SDA251SDA25269.htm> (re-
porting that if the Taliban program to broaden the basis of support for the
Chechens succeeds, specifically through its recent request to Pakistan, it seems that
it will do so not on the basis of the general international prestige of the Taliban, but
on the basis of the Taliban's representatives, if any, of Muslim opinion in other
States).
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of Chechnya, however, remains, to date, largely successful in pre-
venting recognition from both the most powerful actors and a sub-
stantial number of lesser actors. Thus, while the Taliban recognized
Chechnya's independence, its recognition has been met with uncer-
tain reception in international society. Accordingly, the final part of
this article will set forth various examples of international recogni-
tion of States and will evaluate what effect, if any, the Taliban's rec-
ognition has had on the crisis in the North Caucasus.
III. HUMANITARIAN RECOGNITION
Recognition has been defined as "the authoritative decision by one
participant in expressing its willingness to accept another body poli-
tic as a State, as a full participant in world processes of authority, for
multiple purposes."" Writers have debated for some time what pre-
cise legal consequence flows from recognition." An old source of
controversy is whether recognition "makes the State" or, rather, sim-
ply reflects statehood already achieved.12 When recognizing a puta-
tive new State, existing States have meant either to express their ap-
preciation that a legal and factual situation has arisen rendering a
claim to statehood difficult to ignore, or to express their willingness
to take steps, including recognition, to shape the legal and factual
situation into one perfecting a claim to statehood.
8 3
80. MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 75, at 303.
81. See id.
82. See THOMAS D. GRANT, RECOGNITION OF STATES 1-45 (1989) (noting that
the American view has traditionally been that official recognition reflects state-
hood that has already been achieved); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: RECOGNITION OR ACCEPTANCE OF GOVERNMENTS secs. 202(a),
203(a) (explaining that "recognition of a state is formal acknowledgment that the
entity possesses the qualifications for statehood, and implies a commitment to treat
the entity as a state").
83. See European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, Opinion
7-On the Recognition of the Republic of Slovenia by the European Community
and its Member States, 92 INT'L L. REP. 188-94 (1992) (indicating that Slovenia
was recognized by the European Community and its member states on Jan. 15,
1992, after a holding by the arbitration panel that it satisfied certain criteria for
recognition); GRANT, supra note 82, at 162 (noting that recognition in the case of
Slovenia followed attainment of criteria for recognition-which were probably
closely related to, if not exactly the same as, the attributes of statehood); A.V.
Lower & Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 478
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There exists, however, some State practice that would be difficult
to reconcile with either branch of the foregoing model. For example,
recognition, at times, has been granted as an expression of humani-
tarian concern as in the case of the recognition of Biafra. Yet in
other, more recent cases, such as the cases of Bangladesh and
Kosovo, recognition did not result despite grave humanitarian con-
cerns. These divergent examples help inform a conclusion regarding
what the Taliban's recognition of Chechnya may mean and, there-
fore, will be examined briefly below.
Biafra was a region in southeastern Nigeria.M The Ibo were the
majority ethnic group in Biafra but a minority in Nigeria as a whole.
In the 1960s, frictions between the Ibo and the federal government of
Nigeria, in which other ethnic groups held most political influence,
became acute.85 This resulted in Biafra's secession from the Nigerian
federation. Biafra's secession was successful in the specific sense
that it resulted in the establishment of an Ibo-administered territory
de facto independent from Nigeria. Biafra thwarted the first at-
tempts by Nigerian federal forces to reverse secession and came
close to defeating those forces entirely." For a time, Biafran inde-
pendence was securing itself against the competing claim of the Ni-
gerian federal government. No State, however, recognized Biafra
(1992); Matthew C.R. Craven, The European Coninuninv Arbitration Commission
on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 375 (1995); Joe Verhoeven, La Recon-
naissance Internationale: D~clin ou Renouveau 39 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 7, 27 (1993). But see Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The
Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR'N J. INT'L L. 36, 49-51 (1993)
(noting in contrast that Bosnia was recognized before it had attained all the marks
of statehood); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 ICJ REP. 803 (Kreca, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that recognition of Bosnia, then, may have had some 'constitu-
tive' effect-that is, recognition may have played some role in creating the Bos-
nian State, or at least indicated that the recognizing States were willing to take
measures, in addition to recognition, to create a Bosnian State).
84. See JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR 1967-1970, 127-41 (1977) (describing Biafra's bid for independence
and recognition as a State).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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during this time." In 1967, the Nigerian army, while still recovering
from earlier reversals, began in earnest the recovery of the seces-
sionist region. Military operations against Biafra resulted in great
loss of property and life. Nigerian federal forces enforced a physical
blockade against Biafra, and mass starvation began." As the starva-
tion continued, the secessionist forces eventually lost their ability to
conduct any meaningful defense-at-arms.9'
Though the Biafran independence project was, by that point, be-
yond recovery, a number of States-belatedly it would seem-rec-
ognized Biafra. Tanzania, Gabon, C6te d'Ivoire, and Zambia ex-
tended recognition between April 15 and May 20, 1968.92 Somewhat
later, Haiti became the first and only State outside of Africa to rec-
ognize Biafra."' When queried as to why his government recognized
Biafra, the president of Haiti reportedly explained that fellow Afri-
cans of the Catholic faith were suffering under the Nigerian army
blockade and thus deserved moral support.94 Though distinct in its
religious content, this explanation was otherwise broadly similar to
the rationale behind all five acts of recognition. Basically, the condi-
tion of human beings in Biafra deteriorated to a point where a num-
ber of outside observers came to the conclusion that it was incum-
bent upon them to issue statements of support.9' Recognizing the
putative independence of Biafra when the five States did so was not a
statement that those States believed that the Ibo secessionist move-
ment was constituting a State; the movement had been much closer
to constituting a State earlier but was by the time of recognition
manifestly failing. 6 Nor did recognition at that time alter the de facto
situation; Biafran independence had been all but defeated, and none
of the recognizing States were prepared to render material assistance
89. See generally David A. Ijalaye, Was "Biafra " at any Time a State in Inter-
national Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551 (1971) (discussing Biafra's legal status).
90. See Stremlau, supra note 84, at 127-4 1.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Stremlau, supra note 84, at 127-41.
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that might have reversed that fact.17
Recognition of Biafra was almost exclusively a symbolic humani-
tarian intervention-a recognition of the human rights violations be-
ing perpetrated there by Nigerian federal authorities. Recognition for
the purposes of humanitarian intervention, as in the case of Biafra,
marks a divergence from the conventional understanding of recogni-
tion. Yet, the fact that recognition for the purposes of humanitarian
intervention, relatively low in cost and risk, was not followed by
other States raises questions about the necessity of recognition as a
humanitarian device.
In a roughly contemporaneous case, recognition did not arise in
connection with humanitarian concerns at all. East Pakistan ("Bang-
ladesh") had been in union with West Pakistan ("Pakistan")." Bang-
ladesh dissolved that union and forces from West Pakistan violently
opposed secession. Bangladesh secured independent control of its
territory in 1972 and applied that year for admission to the UN.'
Admission was denied until 1974 and recognition was also widely
denied until 1974.'O
Finally, more recently, the NATO States that engaged in military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") de-
cided against recognizing the putative Kosovo in the course of their
own armed intervention, choosing instead to emphasize the "territo-
rial integrity" of the FRY.' °' In the Kosovo action, a claim of state-
97. See id.
98. See James R. Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation
to Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 95 (1998) (discussing Bangladesh's at-
tempted secession from Pakistan).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 95.
101. See, e.g., NATO Press Release 98(80), Statement by .NATO SecretarY Gen-
eral, Dr. Javier Solana, on Exercise "Determined Falcon." June 13, 1998 (empha-
sizing NATO's policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of the FRY); UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1160, para. 5, Mar. 31, 1998; Contact Group Statement
on Kosovo (visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.fco.gov.uk>; NATO Press Release
99(020), Statement by NATO Secretar
, 
General Dr. Javier Solana on behalf of the
North Atlantic Council, Feb. 19, 1999; Crisis in Kosovo and situation in the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, Assembly of the Council of Eur. Recommendation
No. 1400, para. 2 (Mar. 30, 1999) (adopted by the Standing Committee on behalf
of the Assembly); General Principles of the Political Solution adopted by the G8
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hood was voiced by a group of people subjected to severe human
rights violations-indeed, violations characterized by a segment of
the international community as precursors to genocide.02 Although
NATO initiated a military operation to protect those people, no
NATO member State or any other State, with the possible and quali-
fied exception of Albania, °3 recognized Kosovo as a State.
Curiously enough, in the foregoing examples, a robust exercise of
force preceded recognition of an entity. The relationship between
recognition of a State and protection of human rights is a loose one
and some individuals' right have little connection to the acknowl-
edged legal status of the territory where those individuals dwell.11'
Yet, the case of Biafra demonstrates that recognition can be deployed
as a symbol of humanitarian support, and the Taliban's recognition
of Chechnya may well be another example of such symbolic hu-
manitarian recognition.
Recognition of Chechnya appears to have come, as it did in Biafra,
at a point when the de facto independence of the putative State was
in the process of reversal. Prior to its September 1999 invasion by
Russia, Chechnya lacked political stability, and the control of the ter-
ritory of Chechnya by the secessionist government was uncertain at
Foreign Ministers, G-8 Foreign Ministers Point Six (May 6, 1999).
102. See David Pitts, Indicators of Genocide in Kosovo, Says Scheffer, USIA
NEWS (Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/texts/
99040522.htm> (relaying a statement made by David Scheffer, the State Depart-
ment's Ambassador-at-large for war crimes, that "indicators of genocide" had been
found in Kosovo).
103. See Albanian Foreign Affairs Ministry on Belgrade Breaking Ties, USIA
NEWS (Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/texts/
99042022.htm> (announcing Albanian plans to break off ties with Yugoslavia and
reaffirming Albanian support for NATO's approach to resolution of the crisis).
104. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 16
(1992) (describing the Committee's concern that individual human rights were
being violated and demonstrating concern for the basic dignity of the individual).
For individuals to enjoy rights to basic dignity, it is not necessary for them to form,
in their narrower community, an independent State. Id. Some rights under interna-
tional law appear to flow to the individual without the intermediation of a State and
States are obliged to take steps to assure that all of their citizens enjoy rights to ba-
sic dignity. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
4/6316 (1966).
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best.05 The competing claimant to title over Chechnya, the Russian
Federation, held little sway, and, in this sense, the Chechen claim to
independence achieved some success. Recognition, however, was not
granted to Chechnya during that time. Afghanistan recognized
Chechnya in January 2000, at a point when Russian arms largely dis-
rupted (if not defeated) the independent Chechen government.."
This belated recognition of Chechnya by the Taliban bears important
parallels to the recognition of Biafra by four African States and Haiti
in 1968. Authorities in the Taliban government may well view rec-
ognition of Chechnya as a humanitarian device. The Foreign Minis-
ter of Afghanistan, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel, said, "our recognition
has become absolute[ly] necessary because of the brutal Russian on-
slaught against Chechens.', 0 7 Further underscoring a linkage between
recognition and humanitarian concern, the Deputy Information Min-
ister said that "[tihe world should feel responsible and not allow
Moscow to further violate human rights in Chechnya."'' Recognition
of Chechnya in January 2000 is not plausibly explained as a state-
ment that the Chechens' claim to statehood has been vindicated. It
may be that the Taliban government aims to assist in the construction
of a Chechen State, but many authorities suggest that Afghanistan
105. See Caucasus Report: A Weekly Review of Political Developments in the
North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, vol. 2, no. 6 (1999) (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.rferl.orgcaucasus-report/1999/02/6-100299.html> (noting that Vakha
Arsanov, the recently dismissed vice-president of Chechnya, stated that "Chechnya
is facing a choice: to be an independent State or spill the blood of its own citi-
zens"); see also id. at vol. 2, no. 11 (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/1999/03/l 1-170399.html> (noting kidnap-
pings); id. at vol. 1, no. 40 (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://wwwN.rferl.org/caucasus-
reportl1998/12/40-011298.html> (commenting on political in-fighting amongst
Chechen leadership).
106. See id. at vol. 3, no. 3 (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://www.rferl.org/ cauca-
sus-report/2000/01/3-210100.html> (noting hopes of Chechen military leaders that
the support of Afghanistan would aid them in their battles against Russia); W. at
vol. 3, no. 2 (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-
report/2000/01/2-140100.html> (admitting to heavier casualties during fighting
than had been expected).
107. See Afghanistan's Taliban, supra note 38.
108. See Afghan Taliban criticise Iran over Chechnya, supra note 79 (quoting
Taliban Deputy Information Minister Abdurrahman Hotak); Chechen Embassy
Opens in Kabul, supra note 2 (quoting Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Mawlawi
Abdurrahman Zahed as calling the Chechens' a "just fight" against the Russian in-
vaders).
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has little to offer.°9
Others have observed, however, that recognition may be, even in
its limited symbolic dimension, a valuable form of aid." ° As the re-
sult of extensive research, Alexis Heraclides concluded that diplo-
matic support, especially in the heightened form of recognition,
played a role in securing a community's international legal personal-
ity."1 ' According to Heraclides:
If words are "cheaper" than deeds ... then political-diplomatic or moral
support would be more readily available and at a higher level and extent
than tangible support. Indeed, in the seven cases examined, the number of
states providing the former was somewhat greater than that providing the
latter .... But upon close scrutiny, it became clear that the level of politi-
cal-diplomatic involvement was usually low ... and that its extent was
very limited in most cases, whereas the level of tangible involvement was
medium or high ... in well over half the cases. In fact, extensive political-
diplomatic support was evident in only one-seventh of the cases, and
high-level political-diplomatic involvement ... was evident in only one-
third of the cases. 'Premature' recognition or recognition in defiance of
the world community was given [only six times]-five in the case of Bia-
fra ... and one in the case of Bangladesh .... One other... secession re-
ceived recognition: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was recog-
nized by its patron, Turkey, in 1982. Apparently .... states do not
generally find the utterance of such words to be "cheap.""' 2
The weight of recognition has been noted by Heraclides and others
109. See Chechen Embassy Opens in Kabul, supra note 2 (reporting that Taliban
Foreign Minister pledged "all-out backing" to the Chechens). But see Chechen Re-
bels Open Afghan Embassy, supra note 2 (reporting that Taliban Foreign Minister
"has said that the Taliban have nothing to give because of the relentless civil war
with their northern-based opposition").
110. See Alexis Heraclides, Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement,
44 INT'L ORG. 341, 369 (1990) (examining the results of seven attempts at seces-
sion (Katanga 1960-63; Biafra 1967-70; Southern Sudan 1961-72; Bangladesh
1971; Iraqi Kurdistan 1961-75; Eritrea 1961-90; and the Moro region of the Phil-
ippines 1972-90)).
111. See id. (proposing that the support that States render secessionist commu-
nities may be ranked from least to greatest as follows: (I) expression of concern
over the conflict; (2) call for peace talks in a framework of territorial integrity and
unity; (3) call for open-ended peace talks, admitting of a right to self-determination
in the secessionists; and (4) recognition).
112. See id. at 369-70.
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writing about inter-State relations."' Stephen A. Kocs paralleled
Heraclides, but perhaps stated a more pronounced formulation of the
idea when he claimed that:
The law-based model [of international relations], in contrast to neoreal-
ism, suggests that the survival rate of political entities should depend
above all else on whether they have obtained formal diplomatic recogni-
tion in the international society of states. Under international law, the act
of recognition symbolizes a fundamental commitment on the part of the
international community. It signifies extension of the full panoply of in-
ternational legal protections to the recognized state .... Thus, polities
recognized as sovereign states should enjoy a very high rate of survival.
Political entities that lack recognition as sovereign states, by contrast, find
themselves in a deeply vulnerable position. International law offers them
few protections against conquest and elimination by other political actors.
It makes sense to expect, therefore, that political entities lacking diplo-
matic recognition will suffer extinction at a much higher rate than recog-
nized polities. 
14
Focusing on practice of the last half century, it is not entirely clear
how Kocs reconciles his position with Article 2(4) of the UN Char-
ter." 5 To be sure, Kocs is concerned with a long-term historical view
and thus need not necessarily consider legal instruments of the UN
era when assessing pre-1945 practice. Nonetheless, a contemporary
examination of the relationship between recognition and aggression
must take into account modern developments in international law.
Article 2(4) obliges member States to refrain from the use or threat
of force, and the ban protects members of the world body and non-
members alike." 6 Communities at the margins of international power
processes do not lack all protection. Moreover, recent State practice
113. See generally Alan James, System or Socie'v?,. 19 REV. INT'L STUD. 269
(1993) (outlining an international relations study which alludes to the constitutive
character of State recognition).
114. See Stephen A. Kocs, Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: Interna-
tional Law as System Structure, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 535, 545 (1994).
115. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territonal
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations").
116. See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 686 (3d ed. 1991) (describing
the practical application ofArticle 2(4) of the U.N Charter).
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does not entirely sustain the constitutive proposition at root in Hera-
clides and Kocs analyses. China has not as yet invaded Taiwan; nor
is Turkish Cyprus "up for grabs" to any power able to take it. Non-
recognition rarely, if ever, has rendered its object terra nullius.
The UN Charter and its protections against use or threat of force
furthered the development of restraint in inter-State relations after
World War II, and some of the most recent instances of UN practice
have brought legal punishment on States for abuses against domestic
communities as well. UN sanctions against Iraq for mistreatment of
its Kurdish and Shi'ite communities exemplify how international law
may protect the unrecognized. Yet the cases of recognition that these
international relations writers have taken as counterpoints to cases of
non-recognition were for the most part cases of widespread, rather
than isolated, recognition. Recognition of Chechnya by the Taliban
government of Afghanistan stands, then, as a special and limited
case.
CONCLUSION
The effect of recognition of a State of Chechnya by the Taliban
government of Afghanistan is to draw greater attention to a humani-
tarian situation grown acute since Russian operations in the territory
resumed in September 1999. Recent statements of humanitarian con-
cern from international organizations have been conjoined with
statements reaffirming respect for the territorial integrity of Russia.
Those latter statements, however, did not say that the territorial in-
tegrity of Russia is a matter of less concern than the plight of the in-
habitants of Chechnya. Thus, the Taliban's recognition of the
Chechen claim to independence may well be no more than an em-
phatic statement to the international community that the considera-
tion of territorial integrity must in some cases be tempered by the
ever-imperative consideration of human dignity.
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